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T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  C H I C A G O  1 
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The  United Nations 
and the Bomb 
MR. SHILS: The United States through the B a d  proposals 
has prtsented a plan for the international control of the atom 
bomb to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. What 
docs this plan involve? What is the eEcct of the Russian p m  
p a l  which was made last Wcdnmday? 
You have been working on atomiccncrgy poIicy now for a 
long time, Urey ; what is the problem which we face? 
MR. UREY: There are three alternativts in the solution of the 
problems raised by the atomic bomb. The first is m do nothing. 
I think that this is most likely the program which we arc to fol- 
low. The second one is to attack immediately whi i  otha people 
do not have atomic bombs. And the third is to secure intcma- 
tiond control of atomic weapons which is adquate to prevent 
their use in war. 
MR. SAILS: W h e ~  do the B m c h  proposals fit into this 
scheme 3' 
I Mr. Bernard hi. B d ,  United Seem rcprem~tadr#lentotive tn the Ammu Energy 
Cornrnkion of Be United Nations, mbmimd the United Stam plan for att- 
t h w i ~ a t l t h e c o n t r o 1 o f t b e a t o m i c h b i n n n ~ t o t h c A d c ~  
Cornmiion June 14x946. Exeerpm from Mr. B d a  add- ue q a o d  brc 
lOW (m pp. 1-13 for the t tXt  d bh p-1: 
"It is to c x p w  this will and make it M v e  that we have ken 
We muet provide the m e c h h  to assure &at n d c  en- b uxd for 
ful purposts and preclude ia use in war. To that end we mwt provide immediaa, 
swift and aut pdabment of & who violate the agreements h t  are rrrched 
by the natiaa~. Penalizntiw ia csatntid if peace i a  to be more than a f c v d h  
in tuMe  ktwecn ware. And, tm, tIse United Nat iw EM +be individual 
rcqmmibility and punishmeat on the priaupks applied at Nwrakrg by the 
Unia of Soviet Soddat Republics, the United Khgdom, Fraacc nad the Uniad 
S t a t t b a  formula attain ta benefit the w0rjd.a future. . . . . 
" T h e b a s i u o f a d  foreignpolicy,in thisncrrq,farPU t h e ~ l l h b e r e  
MR. FINLETTER: Obviously, the Bamch proposals fit into the 
third catwry, because they are decidedly doing sonttthinp 
and they are doing something extremely important. The Baruch 
gathtrad, is that, anything that happens, no matter w h m  or how, which mca- 
ecea the peace of the world, or thC economic stability, ~oacerns each and all of-. 
'That m q l d y ,  may bC said to be tbe central tkkme of the United Nations, 
It is with that thoPght we begin addemtion of the m t  important mbjcct 
that cna emgap mdbd-life itself. . . . . 
"The United Stam theatim d an Inaunutioaal Atwaic h 
dopmcnt Authority, b~ which M be rntrwd aU of the dmtlop 
meat and use of atomic energy, starting with tlu raw ma-mid and including- 
"I. Managerid mad or ownership of all atomic energy rctivitiw potentid 
1y dangernus to world d t y .  
"2. Power to control, inspect and lieawe all other atomic ~c t i v i t i a  
"3. The duty of foetehq the kn&dd aaw of a m i c  entrgy. 
"4. RcsesKb a d  dep.clopmmt respoasibiliih of an &mati= chnracbu 
inttnded to pnt the authority in tht forefrant of atomic knowledge and thus m 
enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, mi- of atomic ea . To be 
&ds+ tbc authority must i d  be the mrWa l c r d u  in the dd?a(lxnic 
knowledge and demlopment and andthus supplement ia legal authority wifh the 
great power inkent in &on of lenddip in kaoralcdgt. . . . . 
'Wow, if if, is the time to act for tht ~ommon & Public &tiion m p  
porn a aPwM mvcmcat toward saurity. If I red the aright, the ptopb 
want P program not c o m w  m d y  of piow thoughtn but of t n f m b l t  snnt 
ti- intcmnthal law with teedl in it. 
When au dquate system for mhol of atomic caergy, induding dre re- 
armciation d the h b  au r weapn, has been agmd upon a d  put into &ti= 
aptration and andip prrniahmeata r t  up fat dat ions  of the ruIm of control 
which arc to be stigmatized sa intcrnntional aimc~, we p r o m  that: 
"I. Mnn&mrt of atomic h b e  &dl atop. 
n2 Existing h b s  dull be d i d  ofpruwtrrat ao the terms of tb tnaty, 
a d  
" ~ . m a u e h r r r i t y ~ k i n ~ n f ~ I n f g n u d o n ~ m t h o k l K i w -  
h o w f o r r b e p m d & o l a d ~ *  
ircadpto 
001Vm- - 
propods provide not only for the control of atomic edw bat 
also for the control and dimhation of war throughout the world. 
MR. Smts 3 Let us examine the three proposals which, as t s ~ r e y  
the nations may wish d aa immadistte and certain in their mecution l a  h b k ,  
ahdd be &xed for: 
"I. lllegsrl pm+on w use don atomic h b ;  
"a w- or ~tpnratiWl, of a&c marerial maitable for w e  in an 
atmaic h b ;  
"3. Seieure of any plant or other propvty belofiging to or Licensed by the 
authority; 
"+ Willful intcrfuenct with the activities of the authority; 
U f. Creation or - a h  of dmgemus proj-b in a m a w  contrary to, or 
in the absence of a liEensc granted by the intermtianal mntml Id . 
* 1 t . a ~ d b c a ~ t i a , t o r ~ e h 1 m l u n ~ m ~ m & w m I m t  
to say to you and to our peoples, hat thc mrtttt dpuni~hment Lea at the very 
heart of our prwrent security system. It  might as wrll bt admitted, here and now, 
that the aubjcet gas sttaight to the veto p o l ~ e t  contained in the Charter of the 
United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atwnie enegy. The Cbstrta 
permits pcndzation only by connvMce of each of rhc five girtat ~ m -  
Union of Soviet Soci&t R c u u b h  the United Kiaadom, China, Pram ond - .  
the United Stam. 
"I want to make vety plain that  I am conceraed here with the veto power 
mly m it afftcte thi p d c d u r  p d m .  Thm must k no veto to protect those 
who violrue tttdt mkma -ntn not m devtlop or ase atomic energy h 
dastructive plqum. 
"The bDmb does not wdt upon debate. To delay may k b &. Thc timt bt 
tm#n violation and prcvcntiw action w pufiihcat would bt d tm ahort 
forareeadaddi~astot$t~omrrembefobwod..  .. 
"But hfm r m t r y  is ready m rclinquieh any widhag wtnpons i t  must 
haw more than wwds to mamm it. I t  must have a guaranty &safety, not only 
q a b t  the o&ndets in tha a-c area, but qaim the ill4 aeera aC other 
t~capt+bacter;olopicpl, biblogical, gas-pcr-hy not?-againat war 
id. 
"In the c l i m i d o a  of war lica &r dutim, for only then wia, nations mast 
to eampch with one aaothcr in bhe productim aDd ux af dzcad 'eeart' wtap 
me which arc etrduatad d c l y  by their capacity to kill. Thin dePiliah progwn 
takes us back not mtreIy to tbe Dark A p ,  but from camos to cham. If IRC IW 
wed in findiag a suitable way to mool n d c  weapwa, it is reason& hope 
thar m map alsD produde the m of other wtapna adaptable to maw htmc-  
dom. Whm a man Iems ro MY 'A' be a, if he learn the rest of thc 
alphabet, ~ o .  
"Let k anchored in our minds: 
' W i s a t w l D l l g ~ a d b y W C i g h t O f r n e t a l ~ b y a n ~ t e o o e .  
P e a c e c a n b e m & ~ t l a d ~ o r J y b y M d u a ~ a d ~ t  
hrtided by snnctions. We muat embrace internadma1 cmpdw or illtern* 
.tiaPmt dhinfqmtion . . . ." (Nm Ywk H d  Tribnw, Jtule IS, 1 4 .  
sukested, face the American people. What about the first p m  
posal ? 
Ma. UREY: The fcsult of the first pmpsal is that in a number 
of y m  we will have an atomic-bmb war. Atomic bombs will 
be used; other weapons of war, such as bblogid warfare and 
many other things> will also be wed. The end radt will be enor- 
mow destruction beyond anything which we can imagine at the 
present time. 
MR. SHILS: But do you think that other nations wiU have the 
b m b ?  
MR. U ~ Y :  Of course other nations will get the bomb in time. 
I suppose that in five, ten years-or maybe somewhat longer- 
there 4 be a great many ammic;energy plants scattered dl 
around the world. They either may b Eor ptaccfd purposes or 
they may exist for the purpose of making war. But that will 
surely come and it will come rcgardlm of "secrets." 
The matter of what atomic bombs will do has been discussed 
a great deal, but it is not +Me, by the ust of English words, 
to -te the diiBdties which have been brought into this 
world by the atomic bomb. 
MR. FINLET~ER: I grant that, Urey. But, by your emphasis on 
the dmtructive power of atomic weapons, X &c it that you are 
not minimizing the dmtructivc power of Othtr =pons-those 
which are already invented and those about which we arc now 
Wnning to talk. 
For =ample, I saw in the p a p  the other day of various 
people appearing before one of the How committees and tollking 
abut the most fantastic kind of biological weapons. 
MR. UREY: Such. wcolpons are difficult to evaluate with the 
certainty with which we can d u a t e  the lrtomic bomb: This is 
true simply because the atomic b m b  has actually been used in 
war and the others have not. The potentiditics of scientific in- 
I 4  1 
ventions for making war, homer, are very mt indead; srnd we 
probably did not get the worst weapon when we got the atodc 
bmb. 
Mr. FINLETTER: But we have had some Bght indiation of 
some of h e  things, like the V-bmb weapons, for example, 
which would pmbably have destroyed Fnndon if they had kept 
on going. 
& UREY: SuI'dy! 
MR. F I N L ~ R :  And I believe that h e r d  Marshall's report 
refera to a fifty-ton bomb already blueprinted by our ordnance, 
whereas the biggest b m b  we used in this war was mound two 
tons. That give mme indication of what is going to happen. 
MR. UREY: Ten tons, I think, was used. 
Mr. F ~ ~ L E ~ E R :  Ten tons was used by the British, but ours 
was m, waa it not? 
Ma. URRY :Something of that sort. 
MR. SHILS: I would l i i  to ask what you thinlc would happen 
to our society, Urey, if we do nothing to control the use of 
these terrific weapons abut which Finletter has been telling us. 
MR. UREY: If we live under the threat of total war of any 
kind, atomic bombs or otherwise, we arc going to have to bt 
come a policed state in which we wiU lose all our liMa which 
we value so highly. Someone will have to tel l  us wherc we are 
going to live; whether we are going to scatter our cities or not; 
and so on. 
Ma. F I M L ~ E R :  YOU mean to say that in your opinion, Urey, 
we wiu have a full authoritarian smte, which will be bossed by r 
few p p l e  irom the top and in which all our civil liberties will 
go. Is that correct? 
MR. UREY: I cannot imagine anything else. 
Is 1 
Mu, SBILS: Why will that be necessary? 
MR. UREY: It will be necessary because with the threat of 
atomic bomb we have a new kind of warfare--one that will be 
gin very suddenly and end in a very short time. Hence, it is 
necessary to keep on the alert at every minute, day and night, 
year in and yeiir out. Otherwise, by means of the mckcts carry- 
ing atomic bombs or by high-fl ying airplanes with atomic bombs 
or perhaps by planting them in our cit iesone way or moth- 
bombs will come on a moment's notice without any declaration 
of war. 
MR. SHILS: Then you think that we would have to be in a 
state of perpetual national emergency-a perpetual atomic dert. 
MR. FINLETCBR: We ate talking about the negative side of 
things; I think that we dso ought to concentrate on thk loss of 
the affirmative things. For example, I believe that something 
like 98 per cent of our taxes and of our national a p s e s  in the 
last years (not just during the war but kfore) have gone to the 
cost of war--past, present, or future. Just think what we could 
have done with that money in terms of constructive effort. 
MR. UREY: Maybe this is aiso on the negative side, but it is 
illustrative of what you say. This war probably cost the p p l e  
of the world between one and two trillion dollars. Our share was 
something Iike a third of a trillion dollars. 
MR. FIHLETPER: But we cannot measure this sort of thing in 
dollan. We have to measure it in term8 of datruction of every- 
thing which the people of the United States think of as decent. 
I t  is going to be dstmyed even before the atomic war, because 
we are going to have to have that kind of state in order to sur- 
vive, Then, when we get into the war, it is going, finally, to be 
destroyed. 
MR. URBY: I wodd like to come back to one point. If we do 
16 1 
nothing about wntrol of a m ' c  -pons, thb h!:the.m?- a 
which wilI happen. I want to emphaii that. Do mat ~ W - g h a ~  . ,,, 
b~ avoiding the d i f  dties of a a n p e ~ v ~ t  at& &, ' 
atomic bornbe we have an m y  way out. An easy way h imk .' i 
Mr. FIHLETTER: I take it that what we are calking about now 
is what happens in c w  WE do not face up to this problem md me 
our bfams tu d v e  it. 
*MR. SRILS: What is likely to be the outcome of this national 
mmcy-the permanent national emeqmcy which is at+ 
sockteP1 with an international armaments race in atomic b o d s ?  
Would you marindn peace that way 2 
MR. UREY: No, I do nut thitrk so. The time will come when 
some "Hitlet" will h e  in some country of the world and ma- 
dude wmhgly (as Hider concluded) that he can conquer the 
world and get for h i d  a great d d  of power or a great ad- 
vantage far his own country. 
MR. FJNLETPBR: Is it not true that t h m  new weapons-the 
atom bomb and a l l  thm other things--do lend thcmselozs par- 
ticdarly to the advantage of the aggmtm? In other wwds, the 
blitzkrieg seems more -Me with tkme thin@; and, therhm, 
the aggrwsots art more apt to use them 
MR. SMLS: Is there not a danger, though, that we might even 
become agmsive o d v t s  in this terrible s h t e  of tamion$ not 
because we are deliberate. or cddating about it, but h w  we 
w i l  be so tletvous, the tension Will be SO iRtoIerable, that, in 
ordg to get the condition over'with, =me will say, 'Zet$ 
let the bamh fly"? And we wl ha& a mrld war of a&c 
bomb. 
? 
ML WHLETTBR: It seems to me that, with the kind of gwem I 
mmt whi& we k c  now-that is  to say, r gowmtnent whicb 
171 g 
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is m by the people-there is no possibiIity that the people 
would stand for our starting on an aggnssive war and throwing 
bombs around. But I am willing to concede that if we have the 
kind of authoritarian government which Urey has h e n  talking 
about, wen the Amaim people might do anything, including 
starting a "prmmtivc" war. I wiU cancede that. 
MR. SHIM: We should also make the point that people, b 
cause af the fear of d~truction by atomic bmh and other new 
type of weapons, mlght become ao irrational from panic in this 
country that they, out of sheer -tion, will say, "Let us 
have a war and get it over with, even if we are destroyed." 
MR. FINLUITSR: Certainly thOhit fmt two alternatives of 
Uteyys do not seem very pleasant. No. I is going to mean the 
destruction of this country; and No. 2 might be the destruction 
of another country along with this one. 
MR. SHILS: Them was also a third alternative. 
MR. FINLETPER: To oversimpfify it, Shis, the third alterna- 
tive is to adopt the Baruch pmpsals in their FalI implications. 
Let me say at the outset that the Baruch prop& are not 
specific on all points. Thm is a good deal of latitude them for 
interpretation; but, certainly, taking the spirit of rhost pm- 
p d s ,  and the letter as d, it seems to me that they call tor 
the elimination of war under the rule of law. This is also an- 
other way of saying that we need a form of Lrnited worId govern- 
ment. 
MR. SH~LS: Let us look into the B m c h  pm@. We might 
distinguish between the technical aspcts lrnd the wider p 
litical implications. Urey, you have been d a t e d  with the dis- 
cussion of the Baruch proposals. Tell us about them. 
MR. UREY: Fit of all, Iet me say that I think that we have a 
little time yet to discuss what wt wdI do on international control 
I 8 1  
of v a d c  bombs. We d~ not need to -a dehhd*~~ 
*Y. --  t 
&. RHLETTER: HOW won, though, Unp? 
MR. Urn: In the cuurse of the months to -me. 
MR. ~ I E I T E R :  Months? 
Ms. ~ ? I M L ~ R :  We have not very many years, thoagh. 
N h  UREY: No. We & not ham m y  years; but we have a 
little time to discus9 it. 
MR. SHILS: Why do you think that we do not have SQ much 
tim7 
MR. U ~ P :  Recause other countr+a can get the secret of the 
atomic bomb by thdr own &m in a dlrtivdy short time. 
Morerrw, if they work on the problem of pmducing bombs for a 
short rime, they wil l  get a v c s d  interest and wil l  wish, thtn, tu 
continue their work. War is a destructive business. 
MR. ~ L ~ T E R :  Let me undemtmd that, Utey. Wben ~ Q U  
say other nations do not hpc tht bomb now but that thtg will 
get it mme time or o w ,  I gathar that pou tbinlr within a fhirIy 
brtperiodoftimethcywillget rvcsbadintemtinit. Inothcr 
~ 3 & A m t r i ~ ~ c h a v e ~ ~ ~ ~ ' t o t a k e t h e  
Ieaiiedip Mom they get tht mted iamxs, and it f much 
casicrfor~btri~psopletogttridofthebambthro~ut 
the wo&andget~ofwarnow.fnotberwlo&,itiagloingb b&. 
come inmingIy hder  to gtt rid of it. 
MR. U B ~ :  That i8 d y  what I mean. 
ME. SHIM: Urey, could you bell ars a bit about tbe &icd 
~ o f t h t B a m c h ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ & I  
Mn, UREY: The Baruch pmp~~ala Ibllow, otl the tecbid 
I9 1 
side, the Acheson-Liiienthal Report? An atomic development au- 
thority is proposed which would operate under the united Na- 
tions. I t  would have under its direcr ownership or immediate 
mntrol the mines which produce uranium and thorium. It would 
have complete control of all dangerous activities, such as power 
plants containing hionable material which might be used im- 
mediately for the production of bombs. It wwld then allow 
citizens and countries throughout the worId to develop the non- 
dangerous activities like the beneficial uses of radioactive ma- 
terials for m e d i d  purposes and things of that sort. This pro- 
posal devises some very g m d  danger sjgnaIs which wodd enable 
us to know rather quickly whether some other country intended 
to violate the agreement and. thus make it possible for us tostake 
any action which we saw fir. And it trim to have these danger 
signals such that wc would have time to do something about the 
matter. 
It, of course, emphasizes the positive benefits of atomic energy 
and gives the atomic-dwelopment aubr i  ty something b m ~  
ficial to do. I t  is very difficult to think of a mere police organiza- 
tion, with nothing but negative things to do, as having any very 
great dectiveats in the world.3 
*?.he United Staas propoad for tbc interuationd control of a d c  e n q y  
waa drawn up by the Committee on Atomic h c r g y  mi sobmitred m the Seer& 
targ of S t ~ a  on March r7,1g46. See REubEn G. Gustavsm, Joyce Steams, mnd 
Harold C. Urey, Th fmpIicutions qf Atomic En-, a Uniwdtg of Chic* 
Roum TABLE rransuipt, No. @.+, broad- May 5 , 1 9 4 .  This pamphlet con- 
tains a m i a l  suppkmcnt of excerpts from the AchcmLilitnthal report. 
a The text of the Bmch p d  f b 8 :  
"I now submit tht f W n g  mcasorea as representing tbe fundsmmtal 
features of a plan which would give effect m certain of @ concldom which I , 
havc e p i m i d ,  
"1. Gntmal,-The authority should act up a thorough plaa for con& af the 
field of atomic energy, throllgh various i o m  of cmtrship, dominion, lieen- 
operation, inspection, rcgtarch and mnnagemcnt by eompttent pmaael .  Aiter 
tbis iu  provided for, them should bt m E& inatfrrma aa may be with tht eco- 
nomic plans and the prwent private, EofpDratt and state relntioaships in the 
stveral cwntrjca involved. 
"r Rare mcrlm'al~.-The authority dmdd havc rra one ad ia earlitst p-8 
MIL Smts: Finletter, perhap you might p into some of the 
political assumptions and implications of these technical p m  
pala which Urey has just been t a n g  us a h t .  
to obtain sad maintain eompItce *Ild accurate inlormanan on watM wpph 
d u w l i u m ~ t h o r i u m ~ m ~ t h e m o t d e r i m d o m i n i o n . T b e & ~  
patarn of contrd for & typcs of Wts of auch matctipls dl have to 
depmd u p  d~ geologicd, mi-, refining and ccoawnic facm indved ia 
di*t dtuAh.  
"The mhtitp aboald Fondtlet eoat iam m e y a  so that it witl have the 
mort eompkte howledge of the rrorld of uranium d Mm. Only 
a f a e r d n u t m t i n f m m a t h n o n ~ s ~ I d ~ o f u r a n i u m  d h o h n i s % n o w n  
UN dl can equitabk fins k mlde for their pductioa, iefinine a d  htribu- 
tim. 
"3. e m m y  ~~ p k / ~ - T h t  authority nhdd txe& complca 
d mtrd of the pducmn of iWonable mattriala. lib mema that it 
mmoi and opcmtc dl plants pdadng 6mion&Ie mateti& in danger- E r  
m qluatiiia and mwt w and eootml tbe product of tbcst pIpatr, 
"4 AAPaPic mpbims.-The autbrity should be given & and crduive 
right MI d t  & in the 6Jd of atomic exphivw.  m a r c h  pCtipitia in 
the dcld d atomic cxpkivea are m t i a l  in ordct that the authority may keep 
in the Wmt of in the field of atomic e a q y  and MI the objective 
of pfewsrting illidt maaufactruc af bomb. Only by maintaining ib +tion 
M tbt bat infbrmcd agency wi l l  thc authority k able to determint the liae bp 
men weinsidly d~ngvws and mn-danguolia nctivi~h. 
"5. h g i c  distribution d librim'ric~ a d  m&k-The activities enmasd 
exdpsivcly b the authority bccwmc they nre inajnaricdly d m g c m  to d t g  
&odd b dktribuad throughout thc world. Similnrly, stdcpihs of raw ma- 
terids and h i m a b l e  matetiah aboald not bE centrnlid. 
''6. N o h g m w  &n'Pin'c~.-A function of the anthority ahodd be pmmp 
tion of tbe -time lm&ia 4 a d c  eatgy. A d c  d(treept in tx- 
phivee), the ose of rtscnrch reacme, the production of radimtiw tractla by 
mc~nrdwrpcdm%musruftors,theustdorwh~acuqand tosomtcxtentthe 
pduction d power rhouId be open co naaiwn and tbdr u h n a  uader reasoa- 
able W n g  mranpmcnt~ fmm tbt aabrity. hnatumd m a t e d ,  w h  use 
W E l r n o w a l s o ~ h S n i ~  
by tht authority under w Y P  o ammgcmmt. f"mbM knatruing fOfsuEh accm www to hrtvc 
b#n over-~~timatcd by the public aa a safety rnemuc. 
"7. D@!~ou,~ T~PBIW nl noulqmw d o i t i t $ . - A I M  a 
mnabk drmdmg b can drawn betwen 
tiw, it t not hard and faat. M o n  should, - fore,bt m- made to asswe BEtivi- con- 
a t a n t  d a t i o a  of the qnmianm, a d  to permit revhim of the ditridiw liae 
na chpngiae coaditiunn pad aw dbcoverim may quire.  
"8. @mtims d"v"pw &k'Pirits.-hy plant Wtrg with uranium or 
thorium after it a c e  rcacbts the potential of dmgemu me rut be not cmly 
anbject rn tbc molt rigormrs and competent iaspcctim by the autboritg, but its 

in thc mse that they make it adaMe to mPn%ind, By hvkg 
p a a d  that one over, they thm provide for the world diePrmt 
m a t  of atomic weapons. That is right, is it mt? 
MR. UEY: That is a mndusion which we can very d y  
draw. 
MR. FWLE~SR: Do you &ids that you can e l i t e  just 
the atomic bomb without eliminating other weapons as d? 
MR. URBY: No, 1 do not. I have always hoped that we would 
b able to start with the atomic bomb and go on from that p i n t  
to the elimination of planes and ship and everything which has 
anything to do with war. 
MR. FXNLEITER: But let me insist on that question a little bit 
more. I mean, is it possible redly to provide an &tive system 
for eliminating atomic weapons unless we eliminate other 
weapons simdtaat~usly as well? 
MR. UREP: YOU push me M, and I thing that 1 have to 
agree with yout proposition that what we arc looking h r  is 
what Mr. B m h  mentioned in his qed-mmely, thc elimina- 
tion of war. That is really the solution to the problem. 
MR. FINLETTER: All right. At tht cost of some repetition, I 
want to emphasize the implications of what you have said. You 
pointed wt that we -not get rid of the atom bomb alone; that 
mbal wthwitica. The d s d m  should d v e  a dear demlvcltiw of the 
l~ope  d d u h  and mbilitia ofatrch n a t i d  ~flthdtiu. 
" A n d n o p p I e l l d I h a m w h i t a d 8 n w t l i n c f w ~ t ~ . O O T ~  
U t i m  will k broadened by t?lt &tidm of the Uited S w  a d  
by the p l w  of tbe otha adam, which, it in to bc hoped, dl bt mbmid at 
&& -17 eonvenitllee. I and my d k t ~  of the U n i d  Stat# dekpfiom wi l l  
make avarlnble t~ cneh m c m k  d this h d y  b k a  and pamphkh including the 
-nth& re- reantly made the United Smm -t oE 
S w ,  a d  the M e M h  C~mmittte hi-ph No. I entided h t i d  In- 
k t i m  on A d  Energy' relating m thc McRiahm bill roaatly p d  by 
the Uniaed Statw Seaaat, d c h  may prove d vdue ia aascshg the itua6m" 
Wim Ywk H d  Mw, June 15, IMQ. 
we have to get rid of othcr w a p n s ;  and that, in getting rid of 
other weapons, we get rid of war. That is exactly what Mr. 
Baruch said. If I may just t you a a p l e  of sentences from 
his rcport, it will make this very important p i n t  clear: "Befort 
a muntry is  ready to relinquish any winning wapons, i t  must 
have mom than words to reassure ir. It must have a guarantee 
of safety, not only against offenders in the atomic area, but 
against the illegal users of other weaponebacteriological~ bi* 
logical, g m r h a r w h y  not ?--against war itself. In the dim- 
ination of war lies our 5oIution."4 
MR. SHILS: H o w  is it going to do this? What does this have 
to do with the veto power which has been discussed recend y ? 
MR. FINLETFER: It is going to do it by two political prin- 
ciples. It is going, first of dl, to give the United Nations the po- 
litical power to act. 
Let us take a concrete case. Let us suppase that, for example, 
in some city of Russia or of the United States (and I think that 
those are the countries which we are going to talk about over the 
next fifteen years or so; others will come up later; but Itt us take 
our p m m t  troubles), let us suppose that it is alleged that some- 
one is violating the law-let us say, illegally manufacturing 
atomic weapons or infantileparalysis weapons or whatever they 
may be. Now the question of enforcement comes up. Let us sup- 
p i e  that it is in the Security Council oCUN whm the decision 
has to be made. Rwsia or the United Starts could veto any ac- 
tion whatsoever by the United Nations, and the United Nations 
would then not have the politid capacity to act. Therefore, 
Pillar No, I of the Baruch p ~ i n c i p l ~  is that we must get rid of 
the veto, Without the dimination of the veto, all this is non- 
sense and will not work. 
MR. UREY: There is another thing in regard to putting in an 
4 %  note r ,  pp. 1-3. 
effective control. We must get rid of the lrrrge 
world. Taking a specific example, let us thin% d d . 
happen if thc United Statm or Russia, at St. L&r or MW 
or o h  pl-, s W  violate the agreement in 4 W aabwmdc 
energy. How would the Unitad Nations do anything to m t  
that i1lcgd action? I.& us s u p  that the -try + the 
violation took place intctposcd an army in the way of the United 
Nations. 
MR. FINLETTER: In other words, let us assume that we did 
not have the veto. Therefore, in that particular -, let us sup 
pose that neither Russia nor the United States, whichever were 
the offender, had the power to veto action. Then action is 
ordered. But the point which you we making is, what kind of 
action? In 0 t h ~  words, it is a war, is it not? 
MR. UREY: It is a war; ccxhiniy. 
h h  F~HLETTBR: The United Nations form would have to 
battle their way h g h  the United Stam Army1 Navy, and 
Air Force or the Rcd Army, as the case might be, in order to get 
a t  the individual. 
MR. SHILS: ID. other words, if we are ta get .rid of the veto 
under present conditions of nationd control of armies, in so 
eliminating the veto, in order to avoid war, we would cpeete war 
for mclves. That is something else which is involved. 
Mr. FIHLE~ER:  If we learn anything, it is simpIy that we 
annot  diminate war by making war. That is the crux of Mr. 
Baruch's pro@ for jurisdiction over the individual. He dm, 
in tbis connection, to the Nfvemberg trials. 
k S ~ L S :  I mn&r whether you could dabmtc a hit more 
fully your interpretation of the Baruch p m p d s  about di+ 
armament. 
MR. F W L E ~ E R :  In h a d  lines, Mr. Baruch says what wesaid 
lxsl  
just a minute rrgo. We cannot stop war by making war. It just 
is not practical. It simply will not work. 
There&, he mggE+ts that we adopt thE principle of the 
Nurcmhrg triads. What is thst principle? It is that punishment 
must be against the individual d e i c t o r  himself. In other 
words, in this bpthtticd case which we arc talking. about, the 
United Nations mdd have to have the power and the right to 
go down to arrest the individual, either in Moscow or in St. 
Louis. 
MR. SHILS :HOW are YOU going to get the individual malefac 
tor, though, if each national state has a large army ? 
Mti. FINLETTER: That is precisely the point whicb Urcy made 
a moment ago. If it had to go through a largc national army to 
get st the individual, the United Nations wodd not ever be able 
to go &ugh without a war. The result would not be juridic- 
tion over tht individual; it would be d r c ~ e n t  by sanctions. 
MR. URJZY: I might remark there abut the use of atomic 
bombs to police the world, which many mple speak about. 
Atomic bombs, I think, are no good for such police purposes. Of 
course, one might say that, since the United Nations has a large 
stock pile of atomic bombs, it d d  jump right over the United 
States Army or the Russian Army and attack their Cit i~ .  But 
that wauId nemarily be an action which d d  unite thosc 
countrits solidly against the United Nations and destroy the 
whole policing function. 
Ma. SHIM : In other words, you think that atomic bombs are 
not vc ry useful for the United Nations police force? 
MR. UREY; Not at all. I would not try to plice Chicago by 
means of a lot of sixteen-inch guns placed around the city so 
that if anything went wrong in tht city, if aome gangster mur- 
d e d  someone, we d d  start to attack the city with Iarge 
weapons, 
1161 
A large weapon is not suitaMe fmplid 
small weapons which diadngzlish 
the world who viola* the and t l k  iadjd&.- . :i 
M*. Rn~mnn: It is worth while to hammtr,pt *-,& 
&we I ngsrd it as the most important prro of the Bay& 
pmpsaIs. Thc veto is equally important, but the veto @'€+ 
picked up by the prugs and largely pnbhcized, d cvurybdy 
undersmds it quite clearly. 3ut the newspaper wlmtamt oh 
thi disarmament qu~t ion  has h e n  entirely 'inadequ~te. 
MR SHIM: The discusion about the veto leads us ta a 
mission of the Rwim p@, The newspapers have Mared 
that the R a s h  pmposal is diametrically opposed to the 
Baruch pm@. What arc the simitarities and .the dihenccs 
between tha R-im sad the h c h  propod? At Iwt, what 
MR. U ~ Y :  The Russians wish to kccp the veto power, while 
Mr. Baruch wiahm agtecmmr that there shall be no veto used 
in the limited rcgion of atomic energy. I hope that it is possible 
e i ~ d t b e G c n c t d A w u n b l y o f t h e ~ & d  J~~~unry,tbcSDvietde@don 
a d y  of the qtmeioa of the condudan of intcrnatimal 
fartUiq theproduction d m  ofwtnpotrs badupon  tbeuacdammk 
Ex for tk ptupoecs of mass btruetica. The purpoet of such an w t  k to farbid the pduction d af ammic ncnpons, the destmcth 
of d h g  B& of r d c  wcapna and the pllaiabmcat of all ~etiPities under- 
t h  with a view to the v i o l a h  J wch agretmtnts. 
"The &bratian and eonduuion of such ngrremenm woald k, in the opinion 
of tk Soviet ddeptiom, only onc of the primmdid mcamm which mwt be 
t P t m b ~ ~ t t J l t ~ r k o f a ~ i c t n e r g ~ m h u m h d y . I t ~ b e ~  
lowed by otber me~outes designed to inaoduce mans of aesuring a lrPict 8lrpw- 
~ O D  d the o h -  of undertakiw entered into, che d u s i o n  in coaatc- 
tion with the abov~mtntioned ngtceaxnq the ~ctting up of a aptem of s u p -  
~ l a d f o n t m l m ~ t h a t P b t m v c l l ~ ~ l l d ~ n ~ p n o M , o n d  
me? wacmiq slaedoas agpinst unlawful w d atomic mugy. 
The public opinioa d the whole of the civilid worM hsa already eon- 
duansd the rn in war af d a t i n g ,  poi- a d  other similar gaseq Pnd the 
me of liquiL Md subetaaccs of the same chnracter, as a h  bacteriological wenp 
am, a d  have cwdudad agrcaaenta forbidding the tim of such weapms. For 
thim put- tHe n d t y  oh c o d d u g  qmement forkldiq the & d o n  
and w of atmic m a p a  ir m a  more o b h .  
"Such a convention d in a high d v  also to ;rbt @rations 
d the pmph d the wbodc world. Thc eondusioa aad e l a h a ~  of a h  an
m n t  sod such a system of m e w m a  to inaurc the atrict obmrwam d 
d w  d t h t  agrmncats, the cz+tablishmeat of a system of mntrol to wt that obe 
oMptiona aratained in tbe sgmmenta were o w  and the urablishment of 
@t t h e  who vialate rbe qreernents, d this, in tk of 
the Soviet *tion, d m t i t u e e  an imptant  step in advance on the way 
dEnrryitlgcut thembllridupan thc A d c  Encrgy Cornmiion.. . . . 
'W of the fundamental elements of thc adsting aimation in chm0trizcd 
by tbc a h  of m y  k i d  of limit tn the production nnd applifatinu of a d c  
weapons. Thcac h t s  arc important con&bthn,  and only strengthen the 
ampicion b d n g  kfwaen ewnuim a d  nrrreen nlatiaru ktwecn thcm, calling 
for the piideal instab% y. It ia dew that a coatinundun of &a Jtuatian is 
lilrtly to bring amly aqptive d m  for tk p e e  of the world. 
"El4dm tbib the mtiawtioa of the &ti% dtuatiw would mean thnt the 
mt m t  scientific ntfniamears in tbis 6dd d d  mot cwsdtute a b a i l  for 
joint den* a m q  the eoun- d i d  mud the dimuy Pnd 
t h c p f e c 6 m o f m c & & d ~ a ~ m e r g y f o r ~ u l ~ F m m  
tbis t h  tollma amly ane m m ~ t  condudan, n a d y ,  th it rs mdtwmlblc 
that &re should sh ould exchange oxdrangeorsdtndfic bbmatiou henran c w n h  and 
that it is idhpumbk that there h d d  be jciat &en& h t a  directed toward 
r brwdcning of k pwsibilicits of thc w d a d c  q d y  in the ia#t#tr 
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-- 
W convince the Russhs in regard to this (&&\MI# 
moment w3 1do net Mieve that we should tEw & 
nretlt is over with the discussions this WE&. Wc k 
dthe raGag afthematerid welfare of the People and in tba -td 
a d t t i e o a n d d t u t e . T h e a u ~ e e e s a f t h e d o f ~ ~ a i l l b e d e t e r -  
mincdinalqemeparre ..A 
international a p e m u t  for tha a~tlawing of h e  @&on d &hation of a I 
w e n p o n b a s o d u p t h c ~ d d m u g y h t h e ~ d m m k ~ .  
T h e @ - a n w g d m h d t h e * s ~ r k d t h c ~ f w & o l r a -  
m d o f a t o P n i c ~ . I w i l l x P s d t b e ~ o f t h c ~ ~ .  i 
"Daeply aware d tht Flrtterne impartaaee of rht great &ntiGc d i d w  
c ~ a a C C # d w i t h t b e ~ t t i n g d ~ n t a r o P a d d t h r v i E w t o t h e ~ o T ~ ~ w m i c  
t ~ ~ r g g f o P ~ ~ d r a i ~ t h t ~ ~ ~ a d s ~ d l i f e o f r h e p e o p ~  
d ~ ~ M , a n d ~ I w t h e d e v e r O p m t ~ t a b c u l m r e a a d m c n e t ~ & ~  
Pf hma*,w5 
"Unrrmnoosly -ring F m i d  -tim an wide aa jmdb for thc w 
d d p e o p k o f a d c t l t i h ~ ~ ~ i n t h e k f d o f  ~ t o m i c t m g y , f o r t h c i m ~  
m e n t d t h t a o n d i r i o a s 0 6 t h e l i f e d ~ p w p I w 1 d t h t w ~ ~ t 6 t r a i d q  
of && s t d a d  of d m  a d  further progm of human etlltwcj 
'Taking m t  & d y  d the fact that the p a t  &tide di- in cht 
fidd of atwric energg maria a great fimt and foremost for the pcmful 
~ a a d a v t l i . n ~ o t i w s 2 n c a s e s t P c h n d i ~ a r w e t r s s d p s a m ~ o f  
a n a t m n i c ~ ~ ~ p o n f o r c b e p u q m w d m a a d w t r u ~  
w ~ a l a o o f t h e p t i r n ~ o f t h e f a ~ t ~ ~ i n t e r a ~ c  
t i d ~ m , ~ w f n d m t o f w a r a f ~ t i n g , p o i e o a o u s d M b & r  
~ a r ~ a n d & W u l i q l l i d s , & r s n a ~ P n d ~ r a d a b s k  
w r i d q h l  metids haat a h d y  bttn oudnwd by wmrnon d ktrreca 
rhrddidppIqaQd 
"Wdcring that the i n t e r n a h d  &wry of tbe we of tho a t d e  weppon 
for mnm dcmu~tion wwrM eorreepwd in atill mtcr rncame to the aspiratio111 
andtheccrascicacedthcpcoplwofthtw~wod& 
' A a i m d b y a a i n ~ d e s i r o a p t a m o v e t H a t h r e a t d ~ m d ~  
&&diacoPericsTorththarmofhamaniyd+~thintet~mdh~ 
pmic~ docidtd to eonel& a n . m t  w W d  
t h e p d h d w  ~ w ~ ~ ~ p n b a d a p r m t h e u a e d a t o a m i e ~ , a n d f o r  
~ ~ a p p o i n t t d a s t h & p l m i p o t e n t i ~ d ~ ~ m ~ ~  
hfftian's~ wi#j&w, ~ u o d s n r i a h m  f o u d  k kkdwjum) -4 *a: 
Ann- r 
T h e  high mtr&iq p d w  d m d ~  d E d ~  that d q  will forbid tile 
~ d t l w o f ~ a e s p e n b a s t d u p p a t h e a s t o f a t o m i c ~ , r a d a r i t h  
pbiginvb,tnC;tlrpoa thund~ObEfolhingobligati~: 
%)  NO^ t~ h any fit~~msm~~~, an atomic weqm; 
T ~ f ~ t b e p D o a ~ a i s d k f f p i n g d a ~ h a d t q m t h e ~ ~ ~ o f  - 
atomic enwgy; 
. - I 
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some time in order to try to come to same agreement.) Beyond 
that, the Russian propsds leave a very great breadth for dis- 
cussion in regard to the details of atomic control. It is ps ib le  
uc) To destroy mithin R perid of three month from fro entry inm k c e  of 
this agreement all ~welra of ammic energy w e a p s ,  whttbu in a hihi w 
semi-fuhhd d t i a n ,  
Aamc~fi 2 
T h e  high ermtracting pardm d e c k  that my viola& of Article I of ch 
agreemmt nhd constitute a serious crime rtgainat humanity. 
ARTICLE 3 
'The high contracting pnttite, within six months of the entry into fonr d 
the prrsent qmmcnt, ahall pass l + b  pmvidiag M punishment for the 
violation of the terms of tbiu agrccmetlt. 
Armctn + 
"Thc prcaent agreement shall be of indcfinia d m h .  
ARTICLE j 
'The p m n t  agreement ia o p n  for e a r n r e  to all Stam, whether w rmt 
they arc m t m h  of the United N a b .  
ARTICLE 6
'a pmmt ngraement shall come into foroe afar approval by the M t y  
M, and after ratification by half the mpaturc Stam, including d Stam 
m e m h  of the United Nations, PS onder Article Q of the Chruru. Tbc ratificp- 
tima shall fx p l d  for safe kEcping in the bonds of the krewy-GcntrrJ of 
cbe Uaitcd Natiom. 
A R T ~ C L ~  7 
"After the en mto fom of the pma~t -em, it shrU k m oblig~tiaa~ 
u p n  dl S t a q  w % ther members or not of the United Natiom. . . . . 
"I w d  lilK now to read tbe text of the -d w a l .  It cumem the m- 
ganizgtica afthe work d the Cwnmiion for thc control ofamnic mmgy. 
''W d v e s  a* the dociaion of the GGtlual d b l y  of tht zptb of 
Jannay, I&, eomxmkg tbe uctd up d a  cwnmidaion 2m the mdyaf- 
Irnu cmmcd with th dilmrrry 2a-c energy and a k d a t d  q u w h q  
andinpPrticalprupunAtti& 5ofthirdedaioa,staringthemmadrtfenna 
of the Cmnmission, tbe Soviet deI+an oonsiden it n a r y  to mnkt the fd- 
owing p r o ~ m n u r n i n g  Phe plan of theqatktim aftheworkdtht Com- 
mission for the initid pviod of ita activitg: 
"Prrrl r.-The setting ap of cornmi- af the ptlFeuiag the 
aims indieatod in the dceision of thc Genual M y  h~ broc#d with thc nb 
m a t  diapatc?~ and inquim intu all phases of rht probkm and make rmm- 
mendahr  from tjmt to time with i t s p ~ ~ t  tu hat am it hnda Wbk.' 
"In connection with this iam, it q i t e  n w  a~ makhh twcl can- 
mittea *&, as miharp orpas af the Commi&on, 4be m b l e  for a 
pd study d the p d m  of atomic cnetgy and the e l a h r u t h  of rrcpm- 
[-I 
that the Russian props& can be brought into agreement &tJr 
the Bmch pmposds on many details. 
MR. FINLE~ER:  It can be said, can it not, that on the W 
-6om wbieh the Cornmisb might make far the Enrrying out of the d6. 
d~ca of tltc G C n d  -bly and o h  organs of the United Matiom. 
" l t i a & t h a t t h e R s h o a l d k ~ t t r p ~ d t t o w , B e 6 ~ a c o m -  
mittwktbe-ofdtifici-.ThisrwnmitteewonMbcaet 
u p f o t t h e ~ a f s n d y h g p o i n t ( a )  ofhti&~ofrhed&&onof tht Gmcral 
m i y  of the qth of Jaawq, I&. Among tbe b& of this committoe 
d be that of daborating r e m m d a t i o n a  mnce* practical meamcr for 
t8e mgnakation of tbe exchange of iaformniion (1) mmkg tbe cmtetlm of 
h Q c  M c a  connccad with the splitti of the a m  and otbv d i s  
c o 6 m  cmmcckd with the obainhg rind lur 9 n t m i c  -, nad (4 con- 
C m n b g t b c e d t h e  ~ t i o n d ~ c a l p ~ f o r o &  
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fundamental propositions-namely, disarmament and the veto 
-the ~ussiah go right along with Mr. Baruch's pro- 
posal in w far as disarmmen t is conccrntd ? 
MR. UREY: Yes, It is quite obvious, it seems to me, that the 
Russians do not want war. 
MR. F I N L E ~ R :  And it is also quite true, is it not, that Mr. 
Gmmyko's pmpsal very dearly r e f e d  to all weapons of 
major mass dtsbuction ? In other words, it went far kyond the 
atomic bmb. 
There is no doubt about it that at this moment, however, the 
two propmats are in disagreement over the veto. But do you not 
think that we might say that that veto attitude of the Russians 
can be e a r d d  poasibly as the first reaction or as a trading 
position ? 
niIieance, and might strengthen the polidcal stability in the world and the 
friendly relatiom between the pcoph. 
"The -tion of rbt two committcea that I have pPopoecd with the casks as 
I d&c tbtm, w d  mean thc adoption of a concrete pIm d work of the com- 
miasion in the initial s t a p  of ita activities and would at the ~c time mean 
the gdoption of the n c w a r y  orgnnizational forms for the carrying aut of io 
wark which d enabIe it to p r w d  quickly in the propaah of the b r d  
exchange of scientific information and m quaiions related to the prevention of 
rbc w d atamic energy for thc harm of humanity. 
"Tk  activity of the c o m m i h  for the theewtrol of atomic e a q y  can lead to 
the dcaivcd d t  only if i t ia in full conformity with the principles of the Charter 
of the Unitcd Natiws, which are at the basis of the activity of the Security 
CwPcil k c a m  the Eommisaion is  an q a n  of this organization, working under 
the dimtion of the SmYitp Coancil. 
"Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security Cwncil, including 
e h ! s  directed ta undcrmit~t the unanimity of rhe m u n k  of the Security 
Coundl, u p  qutstiona of substance are incornptible with the inama of the 
United Nations created by the international organization for the p m ~ t i o n  
of p a c e  and srctlritp. Such attempts- &odd be resisted. I mi- it ncccmq 
to m& this statement in order that from the very beginning of the work of our 
cornmidon I might make clear the e t i m  dthc Soviet Governmutt as regards 
the quwtion of the character pad basis of the work of the ewnmidon u p  the 
quatian of the preparation of im mommu&tima 8s me- of cow 
td d a m n i c  encrgy p l d  before pht Securjty Cwncil . . . ." ( N w  Ywk Tim#$, 
J u t  m, ~ 9 4 6 ) .  
MR. UREY: 1 should think so. At  feast, as I want to epapb 
sin again, we should not Mieve that there is not pi time for 
argument, dimssiob, and mutual education among the RU&S 
and the rest of the fore& representatives and o d v a .  
MR, SHILS: But, Finlctter, would you think that them k any 
significance in the fact that the Russians do nut discuss ins- 
tion and operation in the way in which the Baruch proposals do? 
MR. F I I L ~ E R :  No, I do not think that that is important. 
The whole question is whether or not the United Stat= first will 
make up ifii mind that the Baruch proposals art the pmposah of 
the United Stam government. 
MR. SHIL~:  In other words, you thhk that one of the muons 
why the Russians are holding out and why other nations might 
be suspicious of the United States is that they perhaps fear that 
the very generous props& of Mr. Baruch and of the State De- 
partment do not represtnt American opinion and that the h a t e  
would not support them. Is that right? 
MR. FINLETTER: In the h e  place, Shils, if I may disagm 
with your word 'herous,'* I do not think that there is any- 
thing generous about using one's intelligence in order to try to 
save one's self. This is enlightened selfinterest in Mr. Baruch's 
pmposds, Also, I do not think that nations w e  suspicions of the 
United States. So if you will amend your question, Shils, to say 
that other nations may have. a reservation about accepting our 
propala until they know that they are the officid pmp& of 
the United States government, my answer is "Ya," For the per- 
fectly obvious reason &at these Bmch pro+ m only the 
proposals of the executive branch of the United Staw govern- 
ment-that is, of the Pmident and the Stare Department. Con- 
-, and paurieuiatly the Sanatc, b u s e  this will probaliy be 
w treaty in the form in which it is finally submitted, has to be 
heard fmm. 
MR. UREY: And the Senate and tiu? House of Repmcntatives 
of the United States are likely to do ultimately what the p p l e  
back home in the s m d  villages and the towns and the ciriea of 
the United States wish them to do. Finally, the whole question 
comes back to each one of us in our awn communitie and what 
we think about it. Do we agree that the Baruch proposal is a cor- 
rect one? Personally, I think that it is a very fair pmposal to aU 
concernad. I am heartily back of it. 
MR. FINLETTER: I agree completely with that. It is of the very 
highest importance that the people of the United Stat= get back 
of the Baruch propals. 
May I add just one word? It must be understood that when I 
say "Baruch proposals" I mean the proposals in tbcir pment 
form. They can be watered down in such a way as to be nothing 
, more than another promise to outlaw the hmb.  Then they 
won't amount to anything. As they are now, they provide for the 
rule of law and far limited world government. 
MR. SHILS: Prior to the actual writing of a treaty and pre- 
sentation to the Senate, how could our government give some as- 
surance to the other nations of the world that they mean this 
thing seriously? 
MR. UREY: Why not pass a resolution in Congress supporting 
the essentials of the Baruch speech? If  such a joint resolution by 
both Houses d Congress could be passed, it would help very 
decidedly. 
MR. FINLETTER: ASa matter of fact, we have a precedent for 
that. It was in connection with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
that Senator, then Congressman, Fulbright, put forth the Ful- 
bright b l u t i o n ,  which approved, in advance, the principles 
which eventually were put in the United Nations Charter. 
MR. SHILS: We have come to the point now where we ought 
to try to draw to a head some of the points which we have raised 
1241 
in ow d i m i o n .  The fundamental point to be made 
is only one path for this country to follow if it wants 
smction in a large s d e  war--namely, the establishmmt of a 
mihum world government. 
The B m c h  proposal represents a chance to cross the Rubicon 
from unrestricted nati~nal sovereignty and military policy ta the 
ncctssary minimrun of wodd government. Other nations arc I 
more likely to accept the Baruch pmpsals if they are sure that 
America mcans them seriously--that is, if they tare sure that the 
American people and the American Congms (and the Senate in 
particular), and not just the State Department and the h i -  
dent, mean them seriously. 
If the American p p l c  want other countries to believe that 
they mem thw things seriously, they ought to get their Senate 
to adopt a resolution which will asrm the general principles in 
broad outline of the Baruch praposals, This must be done 
speedily because, if much time is spent in discussion, if yews 
pass, other nations, impatient and increasing in distrustfulness, 
will go on doing research in nudear physics, building up atomic 
weapons, and dcvdoping their own atomic energy installation. 
Then, if we wcte to get the Baruch proposals accepted, it would 
bt roo late, h a u s e  it would be tm difficult to cptablish a system 
of control, once d the other nations have both vwted interats 
and have dso had the opportunity of hiding bombs and secreting 
away hionable material. 
The proposals which Mr. Baruch has presented and which 
have been discussed here seem to be rather drastic. And the 
American people have, on the whole, tended to withdraw or to be 
fearful of giving their suppart to drastic proposals, not because 
individuals were afraid oT drastic proposals, but because they 
were fearful that no one else would support them. But the Amcri- 
can people, in supporting the United Natiaas, have shown that 
they are capable of supporting largwcale imaginative props& 
for world peace. What they have to do is to have the courage 
to support the Baruch proposals and to get the Senate of the 
United States to express itself in the same direction. 
What Do Yow Think? 
I.  What is the relation between the eontml of atomic energy and indi- 
vidual freedom ? Do you agra that a state of continua1 preparation 
for atomic war ia this m ~ y  w d d  mean the end of our f d o m  
and liberty? What would be the conditions oflife in the United States 
under a pupetual atomic cmugency ? Would it lx possible to con- 
tinue s rational discusion of policy? What are the inherent clanpua 
ta the Amuiean people? 
2. Can the United States depend on srtaying out in front in an atomic 
bomb armament race? Will s poIicy of "do nothing" on atomic 
energy inevitably I d  to such an armament race? Can anyone win 
such a ram? Discuss. 
3. Is it practical simply to outlaw weapons of mass destruction? How 
far will thii go in bringing peace? Discuss. Do you agree with Mr. 
Baruch that the real problem is the elimination of war and that this 
entails the elimination of d weapons? 
4. How do the Banreh plans propc#le to place guilt upon individuals 
rather than upon p p l e s ?  Upon what principle is it baaed? Do you 
agree with ita validity? Do you favor the elimination of the veto 
power in regard to violations involving atomic weapons? What 
would te the imprtancc of such a slep for limited world govern- 
ment? 
5. Compare the Baruch proposals with the Soviet plan, as introduced 
by Mr. Gromyko. In what mptets do hey  seun to be in a p e -  
mtnt? In disagrtemtat? Do you consider the pints of variance 
fundamen J ? Would you agree with Fdettcr that thwrc may aimply 
be for the pu- of general political bargaining and negotiating? 
Do you t h i  that final agreement can be worked out? How much 
time b that  for argument, discusdon, and negotiation 7 Is it impor- 
tant that such d i d o n  take place new before other nations get 
the bomb? 
6. Are the peopic in your community M i n d  the Baruch propah? Do 
they favor international c o n d  of atomic energy? How do they 
think that this should be accomplished? What is their pition on 
domestic atomi~energy legislation? Do they support civilian or 
military control? Why? 
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